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Abstract 
Despite the growth in work linking climate change and national level development agendas, 
there has been limited attention to their political economy. These processes mediate the 
winners, losers and potential trade-offs between different goals, and the political and 
institutional factors which enable or inhibit integration across different policy areas. This paper 
applies a political economy analysis to case studies on low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon 
forestry in Mozambique. In examining the intersection of climate and development policy, we 
demonstrate the critical importance of politics, power and interests when climate-motivated 
initiatives encounter wider and more complex national policy contexts, which strongly influence 
the prospects of achieving integrated climate policy and development goals in practice. We 
advance the following arguments: First, understanding both the informal nature and historical 
embeddedness of decision making around key issue areas and resource sectors of relevance 
to climate change policy is vital to engaging actually existing politics; why actors hold the 
positions they do and how they make decisions in practice. Second, we need to understand 
and engage with the interests, power relations and policy networks that will shape the prospects 
of realising climate policy goals; acting as barriers in some cases and as vehicles for change in 
others. Third, by looking at the ways in which common global drivers have very different impacts 
upon climate change policy once refracted through national levels institutions and policy 
processes, it is easier to understand the potential and limits of translating global policy into local 
practice. And fourth, climate change and development outcomes, and the associated trade-
offs, look very different depending on how they are framed, who frames them and in which actor 
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coalitions. Understanding these can inform the levers of change and power to be navigated, 
and with whom to engage in order to address climate change and development goals. 
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1 Introduction  
 
In order to be effective, efficient and equitable, climate policy goals must be integrated with 
development goals (IPCC, 2014). Many developing countries now have plans and strategies 
that set out synergies and implementation mechanisms linking climate mitigation, adaptation 
and development. Accordingly, there is a growing body of literature that examines how climate 
policy initiatives are implemented, as well as potential synergies and trade-offs between 
different climate and development goals (Kok et al. 2008; Stringer et al. 2014; Suckall et al. 
2014; 2015; Harvey et al. 2014).  
 
What is less clear, however, is whether and how climate change and development benefits will 
materialise as a result of these policy initiatives and processes. Understanding outcomes 
requires greater attention to who makes the decisions, and who wins and who loses from 
various initiatives and actions to promote integration. Despite an emerging recognition that 
‘politics matter’ in adaptation and mitigation policy at national and subnational levels in 
developing countries (e.g. Bahadur and Tanner, 2014; Dodman and Mitlin, 2014; Nightingale 
et al., this issue), there remains limited analysis of how, when, why and for whom they matter 
in particular settings. As noted by Lockwood (2013), the academic and policy debates on 
integrated climate and development policy goals have little meaning unless they are analysed 
in relation to the political context in which they are being pursued.  
 
In this paper, we address the question of what happens when global initiatives on climate 
change and development intersect with national policy contexts with their diverse set of actors, 
interests and politics. We apply a conceptual framework grounded in diverse traditions of 
political economy to case studies in Kenya and Mozambique. Our starting point is that initiatives 
to support climate policy and development goals do not enter a political vacuum, but are shaped 
by on-going and pre-existing political and institutional contexts and decision making processes, 
along with their associated actor relations and power structures, which strongly influence the 
social and environmental outcomes.  
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The paper analyses how initiatives for low carbon energy and carbon forestry have entered the 
national policy contexts in Kenya and Mozambique, respectively, how they are being negotiated 
among actors, with what consequences, and for whom. The two cases represent situations 
where the potential scope for synergies between climate change and development goals have 
been identified, but where little is known as yet about how it plays out in practice. As highlighted 
by Nightingale et al. (this issue), adaptation policies and programmes have to date largely been 
considered in isolation from development or mitigation policy areas. The case studies in this 
paper illustrate how the interests of actors pursuing climate mitigation through low-carbon 
energy and carbon forestry can contradict the development (and adaptation) interests of other 
actors. 
 
Following this, we place particular emphasis on the importance of institutions, policy processes 
and social relations and the ways in which these mediate access to resources, and 
representation and voice within institutions and therefore significantly impact upon policy 
outcomes. In this sense our approach to political economy also benefits from insights from 
political ecology which take as their starting point the ways in which social relations, institutions 
and power produce particular types of environment and patterns of resource use (Robbins 
2004). 
 
The paper’s key findings are, first, that the informal nature and historical embeddedness of 
decision making around issues and resource areas of central importance to climate change 
policy is vital to engaging actually existing politics; why actors hold the positions they do and 
how they make decisions in practice. Climate policy and finance are received into existing 
institutions, policy priorities, modalities of governance and patterns of political conflict that will 
shape them and with which they have to contend or compete (Newell 2009). Second, our 
findings show how outcomes are a function of the interests, relations of power and policy 
networks that shape the prospects of realising climate change and development goals. Third, 
our analysis focuses attention on the role of the global drivers on national level climate change 
debates and the ways in which they open up and close down different pathways towards climate 
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change and development goals. Common global drivers are shown to have very different 
impacts upon national level climate change debates once refracted through national levels 
institutions and policy processes. Fourth, climate change and development outcomes, and the 
associated trade-offs, look very different depending on how they are defined, who defines them, 
and in what constellation of actors. This highlights the importance of understanding authority, 
knowledges and subjectivities as noted in the introduction to this special issue. The key policy 
implication of the paper is that this type of analysis is crucial to help decision makers understand 
the conditions under which climate policy and growing sources of finance can achieve their 
goals by shedding light on key factors that may help or hinder the achievement of climate policy 
goals.  
 
 
2 Analytical framework and methods 
 
The idea of integrating climate policy and development goals is not new: Arguably, at its core 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Convention (UNFCCC) is about balancing emission 
reductions with adaptation and development goals. The first comprehensive research on the 
linkages between development, adaptation and mitigation came through the ‘Development 
First’ project (Davidson et al. 2003; Beg et al. 2001; Kok et al. 2008). The key argument 
advanced was that investments in development would suffer if they overlooked synergies and 
trade-offs, leading to increased vulnerability (Halsnaes and Verhagen, 2007). Despite some 
caution over the potential for synergies and co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation 
(Klein et al., 2005), promotion of synergies between climate change and development goals 
gained momentum throughout the 2000s. This was supported by the growing climate change 
focus among development agencies and NGOs, and the increased traction offered by the 
development of more operational concepts such as ‘climate compatible development’, ‘low 
carbon development’, and ‘climate resilient development’ (Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai, 
2014).  
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Apart from the argument that integration of climate policy and development goals can achieve 
synergies, improve effectiveness and avoid trade-offs, we consider that their integration would 
be likely to increase the social acceptability and political feasibility of emissions reductions in 
contexts and countries where historical contributions to climate change have been negligible. 
The rationale for emissions mitigation measures would therefore require added development 
or adaptation-focused benefits (Kok et al. 2008).    
 
Over recent years, the attention has increasingly shifted from the concepts and how they link 
to development policy and practice, to funding and implementation, through a range of 
programmes for development of national strategies, technical assistance, institutional 
strengthening, and capacity building for handling and implementing funded programmes. What 
has often been neglected in these debates has been examination of the politics of climate 
change and development policy, namely the processes through which climate change and 
development initiatives are translated into policy development and implementation at national 
and subnational levels (Tanner and Allouche 2011). Such initiatives do not evolve in a political 
vacuum. Rather, they unfold within and are shaped by existing policy and decision-making 
processes (Newell and Bumpus 2012; Phillips and Newell 2013). Understanding the prevailing 
political economy is central in broadening the understanding and commitment of decision 
makers, to address structural barriers to integrating climate concerns into development, 
improving coordination, collaboration and mobilisation amongst key stakeholders, and 
strengthening institutional capacity to deliver more integrated climate and development 
outcomes. In the broadest sense, the wider political economy determines the feasibility of 
efforts to bring these kinds of changes about. 
 
We situate our work within calls for greater attention to political economy in tackling climate 
change and development (Tanner and Allouche 2011; Sovacool et al. 2015). These calls are in 
turn rooted in debates over how success (or failure) in addressing the causes and impacts of 
climate change will have profound implications for continuing development and the extent to 
which poverty can be reduced (UNDP 2007). We employ a broad definition of political economy 
as “the processes by which ideas, power and resources are conceptualised, negotiated and 
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implemented by different groups at different scales” (Tanner and Allouche, 2011:2). This 
definition signals our intention to broaden the analysis beyond state-focused environmental 
politics, extending it to interactions between the state and non-state actors.  
 
Our starting point is that policy development and implementation processes are best described 
as incremental, complex and ‘messy’, involving actors with often competing goals and interests, 
which deploy knowledge and expertise in strategic ways (Keeley and Scoones, 1999, Tanner 
and Allouche, 2011). Actors influence policy formulation in different ways. Pre-existing 
institutional frameworks and the actions of opposition political parties, civil society, private 
sector interest groups, and the state itself can impose significant constraints on policy 
implementation such that the content and application of policies can diverge substantially from 
original intentions (Bonnal and Kato 2011). This view is in contrast to a traditional rational-
positivist-linear view, in which the focus is typically on the quality of the technical knowledge 
that is available to policy-makers, who then make policy changes grounded in a thorough 
understanding of ‘the problem’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  
 
In order to understand the non-linear, deeply political character of policy processes, we draw 
on the work of Keeley and Scoones (1999, 2003) and Wolmer et al. (2006) on the politics of 
policy processes to deploy a framework that integrates three common strands in understanding 
the underlying dynamics that determine the outcomes of policy and practice (see figure 1). The 
first, politics and interests, emphasises the interactions of state and civil society, and different 
interest groups, social segments or classes. This is the core of classic political economy 
analysis, but it has been criticised for limiting itself to material factors, in ways that overlook the 
role of ideas and ideologies in determining policy outcomes (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; 
Clapp and Dauvergne 2005).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
To address such criticisms, the second strand in the framework, narratives and evidence, 
examines the histories and practices linked to shifting discourses, and how these shape and 
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guide policy problems and courses of action. The third strand, on actors and institutions, gives 
primacy to the roles and agency (or capacity to make a difference) of individual actors. This 
relates to the scope for human or social agency to overcome structural constraints and to 
change institutions and policy processes. Understanding such agency can assist the 
development and implementation of more effective policies and institutional frameworks that 
can bring about more integrated climate and development pathways. We do this by 
emphasising ‘policy spaces’, defined by Gaventa (2006:26) as “opportunities, moments and 
channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses and decisions and 
relationships that affect their lives and interests”. This provides moments and venues where 
advocates for particular climate-related objectives can focus their efforts to exert influence over 
contested policy processes. It is necessary a) for these spaces to be identified, and b) to devise 
strategies for operating effectively within them. 
 
We apply this framework to the cases of low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon forestry in 
Mozambique. The case studies were chosen because they illustrate key intersections between 
climate policy and development goals. We focus in particular on three aspects, which structure 
the case studies:  
1. Context: In each case study, we establish the policy challenge and characterise the recent 
historical and institutional context most pertinent to understanding and addressing it. This 
helps to map out the broad landscape of power within which interventions aiming at 
integrated climate and development policy goals have to operate. 
2. Competition and conflict: We then analyse the actors, institutions and power relations that 
shape the resolution of policy processes on particular terms, favouring some actors and 
outcomes over others.  
3. Consequences: Finally, we examine the outcomes that result or are likely to result from the 
patterns of competition, conflict and collaboration described above. This helps to identify 
who the winners and losers are, how the benefits and disadvantages of current patterns of 
resource use are distributed and how trade-offs have been resolved and could be resolved 
otherwise.  
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Data were collected on each of these components through desk review of academic and ‘grey’ 
literature on the policy context and processes, in-country semi-structured interviews and group 
discussions with government officials and representatives from donors, business associations 
and academia at national and regional levels, as well as learning events (see also Table 1). In 
Kenya, 29 stakeholder interviews were carried out in Nairobi, and a learning event was held in 
March, 2014 (Newell et al., 2014). In Mozambique, the team carried out 24 stakeholder 
interviews, a focus group discussion in Chimoio, Manica Province and a broader stakeholder 
discussion at a learning event in Maputo in February, 2014 (Quan et al., 2014). The stakeholder 
learning events were particularly useful as they served the purpose both of validating 
preliminary research findings, as well as bringing researchers, interviewees and other key 
actors together, mapping the key networks for policy spaces for further engagement. A public 
event synthesising the findings across the case studies were held in London, July 2014, 
providing opportunities to reflect on findings and draw out commonalities and contrasts across 
the case studies.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
3 Case studies: Low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon forestry in Mozambique 
 
3.1 Low carbon energy in Kenya 
 
Context – Renewable energy technologies promise low cost electricity  
 
The energy sector in Kenya presents an interesting test case for climate policy and 
development goals (Newell et al. 2014). Given the low level of access to electricity that the 
majority of Kenyans experience, increasing electricity generation is among the current 
government’s highest priorities and a core strategy for driving economic growth. New renewable 
energy technologies can potentially meet not only climate change mitigation aims, but also 
reduce the vulnerability of hydroelectricity supply to climate change induced water scarcity, and 
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strengthen adaptation opportunities for the rural poor through the provision of energy services 
like irrigation and refrigeration, or the diversification of rural economies through other productive 
uses of energy. 
 
In Kenya, national energy security goals (for cheap, reliable electricity generation from 
indigenous sources) are seen by both government and donors to be well served by some key 
renewable energy technologies, such as grid connected geothermal power and off-grid solar 
home systems. These renewable energy technologies have been judged to be cost-competitive 
with fossil fuel generated electricity (Ministry of Energy 2011). This apparent ‘triple win’ for 
climate change mitigation, adaptation and development has to be put in the context of the many 
inherent trade-offs that are associated with different energy futures, renewable or otherwise. 
There are also high levels of interest in exploiting Kenya’s oil, gas and coal reserves (Mugalu 
2014). This interest is expressed drawing upon discourses of energy security, international 
trade, and national development that are similar to those that have been invoked to accelerate 
the growth of renewable energy technologies. New legislation for climate change 
mainstreaming, energy policy, petroleum development, and devolution form the background 
against which these trade-offs will be resolved.  
 
Competition and conflict – Embedding market-led development through renewable energy 
 
There are competing representations of what constitutes ‘development’, ‘low carbon energy’ 
and ‘pro-poor’ energy policy in Kenya. The recent embrace of renewable energy technologies 
in Kenyan policy is shaped by these representations. The ability of various state and non-state 
actors to mobilise finance and support behind their vision of development is a function of their 
power and is visible in the outcomes of energy sector development. It manifests itself, for 
example, in competition between lower carbon or climate-resilient development pathways 
advocated by donors and a shared interest by some states elites and business actors in the 
potential of recent discoveries of fossil fuels.  
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Policies to mainstream climate change reveal the importance of understanding and engaging 
‘turf-wars’ over authority and resources between and within different parts of government. The 
Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) has been the main vehicle for integrating climate concerns 
in the Kenyan policy context (Government of Kenya 2013). With significant donor support, it 
was developed in 2012 under the leadership of the then Ministry of Environment and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR) to reduce Kenya’s vulnerability to climate change and to improve the 
country’s ability to utilise climate finance, particularly for adaptation programmes. Government 
and donor representatives describe the year-long consultation process that led to the 
conclusion of the CCAP as efficient, ‘smooth’ and ‘rapid’, but wide ranging and able to reach 
consensus across the board.1  
 
Yet the Climate Change Action Plan remained unsupported by national legislation, after 
President Kibaki rejected a Bill in 2013 that would have introduced an independent Climate 
Change Authority to ensure the compliance of different Ministries. In the absence of an 
Authority, the Ministry of Environment has little scope to circumscribe the activities of more 
powerful ministries that may be less invested in the process of climate change mainstreaming. 
For example the Ministry of Energy was represented in CCAP deliberations by relatively junior 
staff from the Ministry’s historically under-funded and politically marginalised Renewable 
Energy division (Byrne 2009). Where these turf wars touch upon core state interests such as 
energy, entrenched incumbent regime interests compete to secure control over an issue that 
relates to and potentially threatens their ways of working. 
 
Yet winners and losers from energy policy are not only created through competition, but also 
through the construction of consensus. As a means of attracting additional climate finance and 
support for adaptation programmes, the replacement for the rejected Climate Change Authority 
Bill had significant political support in Kenya. A relatively robust consensus has emerged 
between government ministries and donors with respect to opportunities for ‘green growth’, 
                                                
 
 
1 Interview with senior staff, Climate Change Unit, Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, 
Nairobi, 29 August   
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since some renewable energy technologies can provide electricity generation at scale and at 
low cost (Ministry of Energy 2012). Large scale wind power and geothermal energy have gained 
traction in formal government policy processes, due in part to the extent to which they serve 
the existing development priorities of government agencies, the climate change concerns of 
donors, and the commercial interests of the international companies that are positioned to 
develop the resources. These technologies have received large inflows of public investment in 
transmission lines (for wind energy), or in remote locations and drilling (for geothermal energy), 
which has reduced the risk profile of the projects for private investors.  
 
This support is in contrast to grid-connected solar power, for example, which has been actively 
discouraged by government, despite formally adopting a policy for its promotion (Ministry of 
Energy 2012). The government’s electricity procurement policy has been implemented such 
that the price to be paid to private sector solar power producers (the ‘feed-in tariff’) is widely 
considered to be insufficient to mitigate the commercial risks of project development. The 
agency of a former Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Energy has been critical in 
determining this ‘red line’ for the government, and the subsequent short-term variability in the 
price has left investors with little confidence that profitability will be established and maintained, 
such that no solar power projects exist in Kenya at the time of writing. One member of the 
Kenyan energy regulator recalls that: ‘As an advocate for renewable energy, I can say that the 
decision to price solar low was a deliberate one’.2 Grid connected solar power has been judged 
to lock the state and consumers into long-term contracts for high cost energy. While formally 
adopting a policy to encourage investment in renewable energy, the informal process of 
creating private sector incentives has been used to discourage investments in solar.  
 
In contrast, solar power has found significant commercial success in off-grid applications, in 
line with government interests. Solar lamps or larger household scale systems can supply basic 
                                                
 
 
2Interview with Director of Renewable energy, Energy Regulatory Commission, Nairobi. Thursday 15th 
August 2013 
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lighting and communicative functions such as mobile phone charging, and are often 
accompanied by discourses of political freedom: freedom from kerosene fumes, from blackouts, 
or from the long wait for grid extension. They also free the state of the burden of infrastructure 
investments, individualising energy supply and shifting the relationship between citizen and 
state with respect to the provision of basic services. Yet despite powerful narratives that 
describe the diffusion of solar home systems as a free market success story (IFC 1998; Hankins 
2000), detailed tracking of the innovation history of these systems suggests that public money 
provided by donors was vital in building markets and networks, and in taking commercial risk 
that the private sector has been unwilling or unable to take (Ockwell et al 2014). Recent 
initiatives such as the US Presidential Power Africa programme recognise the role of the state 
in energy provision, but do so in ways that formulate the state only as the facilitator of 
international investment in both large-scale grid connected electricity or ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
off-grid, poor consumers (USAID 2014). There remains a key role for the entrepreneurial state 
in ensuring sustainable and affordable energy access through long term, proactive and forward 
looking policy; a state which sets the direction of change, supports R&D, and redresses 
inequities through tax, regulation and industrial policy (Mazzucato 2015).  
 
The market-making role of donors in promoting ‘pro-poor’ low carbon development is 
nonetheless ambiguous. Political economy analysis highlights the constraints on the capacity 
of developing countries, especially aid-dependent ones, to exercise policy autonomy over their 
development pathways (Gallagher 2005). In addition to the resources that they provide, donors 
have been involved in the production of knowledge and ideas have also been instrumental in 
shaping energy access in the Kenyan energy sector in important ways. Following droughts in 
the 1990s that highlighted the country’s reliance on hydropower, World Bank institutional reform 
packages were critical in instigating the commercialisation of Kenya’s public electricity 
companies and re-orienting the state toward the attraction of international capital (Tellam 2000; 
World Bank 2005). Donors like working with Kenya because it is market orientated, and in this 
regard the country is often juxtaposed favourably with Tanzania. One manager from a key 
international economic institution commented that ‘Kenya has always been private sector 
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focused and avoided the virulent forms of socialism of some of its neighbours’.3 Yet the private 
sector ethos that now makes Kenya an attractive investment environment for geothermal 
energy companies is the same model that disfavours public investments in extending electricity 
access to unprofitable consumers that were arguably critical in the development of universal 
energy access in the global North. Through both the on-grid and off-grid electricity markets, a 
process of embedding markets in the Kenyan energy sector has unified the work of donors.  
 
Hence, while businesses that stand to benefit from a growth in clean energy would need a 
greater voice energy debates in order to ensure that new energy generation is low carbon, 
assessing the consequences of market-led development for the poor is complex and not directly 
associated with the type of technology utilised, or its price tag. Moreover, while renewable 
energy associations are active in Kenyan energy policy debates, in practice different groups 
have differential access to and influence on government policy that is determined by their 
confluence with state interests. Those that represent small scale solar power technologies have 
reported that the Ministry of Energy has been less receptive to their policy suggestions than 
business groups that can claim to serve state priorities for macro-level energy security, such as 
the Kenyan Association of Manufacturers or the Kenya Private Sector Alliance. These 
commercial users of electricity lobby for prices to remain low in order to remain competitive, 
while some of the same large landowners look to become electricity suppliers to the grid, 
seeking high tariffs to incentivise their investments.4 These interests may not necessarily serve 
the interests of the energy poor or those unable to afford the full cost of electricity provision, 
whichever way it is generated.  
 
Finally, the protracted and contested devolution process underway in Kenya has significant 
implications for the control of energy infrastructure and policy. Counties have made claims for 
control of grid extension for example, since reliable electricity supply is so critical to attract 
                                                
 
 
3 Interview with senior energy sector specialist, World Bank, Nairobi, 21 August 2013   
4 Interview with senior staff, Centre for Energy Efficiency & Conservation, Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers. Nairobi, 19 August 2013.   
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investors. It is also at the local scale where the politics of land are typically most acutely 
contested when land acquires additional value due to its energy resources. For example, there 
has been a long term land conflict and a court dispute involving the Maasai people over the 
Olkaria geothermal project, which involves an exclusion zone around wellheads and restrictions 
on movement.5 Political ecology would alert us to the fact that new climate-driven policy 
interventions or flows of finance need to be cognisant of how they impact local patterns of 
access to resources, the configuration of property rights, and the value that is attributed to low-
carbon resources (Newell and Bumpus 2012).  
 
Consequences – renewable energy, without the ‘triple win’ 
 
Large energy infrastructure projects in post-colonial Africa have always involved forms of 
partnership and dependence between the state and international capital (McDonald 2009). Yet 
renewable energy technologies have come to prominence during a period of energy sector 
liberalisation that raises distinct challenges, and consequences. Technologies such as 
geothermal and wind power provide opportunities for climate change mitigation by exploiting 
the interests that have converged on the role that clean energies can play in addressing Kenya’s 
electricity supply shortfall and hydropower vulnerability. Yet the potential to ‘work with the grain’ 
of existing power relations, to exploit them for the benefit of climate change and development 
goals, is also limited in important ways. There are very real trade-offs to be made between 
serving a broader public interest and creating attractive investment environments; between the 
interests of industrial energy consumers, poor electricity consumers, and those that have been 
remained off-grid for decades under various management regimes; and between the goals of 
climate change mitigation and the envisioned role of fossil fuels such as coal and oil in the 
Kenyan economy. These relations of power have a critical effect on who secures access and 
who is expected to offer sacrifices in the name of national economic development.  
 
                                                
 
 
5 Interviews with senior energy programme staff of international donors August 2013; interviews with 
energy sector consultants, August 2013   
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Moreover, these landscapes of power are consistently evolving. New power struggles are 
unfolding over the spoils of devolution and the authority that central and county level 
governments will exercise over key areas of policy such as energy. However, devolution looks 
like being a possible site for change since some counties have been enthusiastic about 
supporting renewable energy. If they are able to generate real benefits in terms of jobs and 
revenue, decentralised institutions could provide tangible wins for poorer groups. This is then 
both a worrying and exciting time for Kenya. Frequently affected by drought and highly 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change, Kenya has a lot to lose from climate change. But 
proactive responses to the issue that can help to improve energy access and do so in a low 
carbon way suggest the genuine potential of climate and developmental policy. Achieving 
equity in climate and energy policies is likely to necessitate not only an increase in social power 
for some actors, but a reduction in social power of some key incumbent actors and ideas.  
 
3.2 Carbon forestry and REDD+ in Mozambique  
 
Context – emergence of carbon forestry and REDD+ 
 
Carbon forestry and the discussion around efforts to set up and implement REDD+ in 
Mozambique offers another pertinent example of the barriers and opportunities that climate 
policy and development goals will have to negotiate in practice (Quan et al., 2014). REDD+ 
stands for countries' efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, 
and foster conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks (FCPF 2015). Initially set up as a mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation, REDD has evolved and expanded to put increasing weight on ‘non-
carbon benefits’. With the discussion around safeguards, intended to address, among others, 
socio-economic concerns and equitable distribution of benefits and costs, REDD+ has 
increasingly moved into the development arena (Brown et al. 2008, Sunderlin et al. 2009, 
Angelsen et al. 2012, Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2012). Growing attention is also being given to 
potential opportunities for synergies between mitigation and adaptation goals through policy 
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coherence, enhanced ecosystem services, and attracting funding for multiple goals (Elias et al. 
2014, Leonard 2015).  
 
In principle, Mozambique is an attractive country for REDD+ investments due to its extensive 
forest cover (more than 50% of the country’s land area) and high deforestation rates (Parker et 
al., 2009). Yet REDD+ and carbon forestry have emerged in a contentious political context in 
Mozambique, in which there are controversies over forest and land governance. The 
institutional context is characterised by lack of harmonisation amongst sector policies, weak 
implementation of forest policies and legislation, lack of capacity for land use planning, and a 
lack of incentives to maintain forest cover (Sitoe et al. 2012).  
 
Since 2007, a number of proposals have been put forward to dedicate large areas to forestry 
and forest conservation land uses supported by REDD+ finance for purposes of carbon storage. 
The wave of REDD+ implementation proposals amounted to over 30% of Mozambique’s total 
land area (Hanlon 2012, MICOA, 2013). These emerged against the background of rapid 
growth in large scale land investments in Mozambique, which has led to growing incidence of 
tenure insecurity and land conflict. In particular large scale forest investments in central and 
northern Mozambique have attracted considerable publicity and interest amongst researchers 
and development agencies (FIAN 2012, Norfolk and Hanlon 2012, Cotula 2011, Oakland 
Institute 2011, Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010). 
 
A key issue has been forest exploitation and management, including illegal logging, 
unprocessed timber exports, and the role of external, notably Chinese, interests in deforestation 
(Mackenzie 2006; Mackenzie and Ribeiro, 2009; Nhantumbo and Izidine, 2009). Linked to this 
are discussions over benefit sharing with local communities, in particular from large scale land 
investments, and their impacts on small farmers. Although Mozambique’s land law recognises 
the land rights of rural communities established through customary and beneficial occupation, 
and enables them to register these rights through a relatively simple process of land delimitation 
(Borras et al. 2012, Norfolk and Tanner 2006, Tanner and Baleira 2006, Toulmin and Quan 
2000), community land registration has not been systematically implemented by the 
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government. In contrast, private investors have found it relatively easy to gain leasehold titles 
for commercial logging and agricultural land development, for which the law has provided only 
rather weak safeguards and procedures for consultation for affected communities (Hoekma 
2012). 
 
Debates on REDD+ in Mozambique have been narrowly focused, with few references to 
ongoing forest management problems, nor the role of forest resources in climate change 
adaptation. While REDD+ is nominally part of the country’s national climate change strategy 
(RoM, 2012), REDD+ planning has so far been focused on carbon benefits and financial 
resources, with no provisions as yet for REDD+ activities to contribute to adaptation.6 
Stakeholder representatives interviewed in our case study described the REDD+ actors as very 
separate from the debates over adaptation, and REDD+ as a “non-issue” in the wider climate 
change debate.7  
 
At the time of data collection (November 2013 – February 2014), no progress had been made 
on practical implementation of REDD+ financed projects. Only one carbon forestry initiative was 
operational, the Sofala Carbon Project, carried out by the company Envirotrade (Jindal et al., 
2012). None of the other proposed REDD+ projects had been approved, and the tax regime, 
licensing and land allocation conditions imposed now appear to create significant disincentives 
for proponents. In parallel however, the policy network has broadened through establishment 
of an alliance of local and international research institutions and NGOs which attracted 
Norwegian funding for a programme (known as ‘Testing REDD’) to scope and pilot REDD+ and 
related social enterprise initiatives, alongside government, local communities and forest 
stakeholders and users in central Mozambique (Nhantumbo 2013, Nhantumbo et al. 2013).   
 
                                                
 
 
6 Interviews with MICOA officials dealing with REDD+, November 2013 
7  Interview with multilateral aid official involved in climate change discussions in Mozambique, January 
2014 
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Significantly, in response to the wave of proposals for large scale forest land concessions for 
REDD+ from potential investors and international agencies, Mozambique has developed 
framework legislation to manage the licensing of REDD+ projects and associated government 
taxes and revenues, with assistance from the World Bank and others. A national REDD+ decree 
was published in December 2013 (Government of Mozambique, 2013). This was welcomed by 
commercial actors and conservation agencies eager to start implementing, but also raised 
concerns about encouragement of large-scale projects, and difficulties in organizing benefit 
sharing with local communities other forest users.8 In practice, knowledge of REDD+ finance 
opportunities appear confined to central government, a handful of international agencies (World 
Bank, UN-REDD and some bilateral donors) and investment proponents with an inside track.  
 
Competition and conflict – actors’ competing narratives on carbon forestry  
 
Broadly, three competing narratives on carbon forestry and REDD+ can be identified in 
Mozambique (Quan et al., 2014). One frames carbon forestry as a potentially significant for 
growth as a source of revenue and employment; another is critically opposed to REDD+ 
perceived as commercialisation of nature for private gain that risks exclusion of the rural poor. 
A third narrative accepts REDD+ conditionally, as having potential to contribute to climate 
mitigation and scope to deliver real development benefit depending on the practical approaches 
adopted. Whereas government and the private sector have generally aligned with the first 
perspective, and a group of vocal nationally active NGOs linked to global Via Campesina and 
Friends of the Earth International adopt the second, a more mixed grouping of civil society, 
academic and some private sector actors and international agencies, including the Norwegian 
supported alliance of ‘Testing REDD+’ (Nhantumbo et al. 2013) adopts the third, middle-ground 
perspective. Others have remained agnostic and not engaged in REDD+ debates. 
 
                                                
 
 
8 Stakeholder meeting, Maputo, February 2014 
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Private sector actors have, not surprisingly, viewed REDD+ primarily in terms of business 
opportunities, as reflected in the earlier rush to develop large-scale projects. However private 
sector understanding appears to have evolved and diversified as the process has moved 
forward; in particular, some do now highlight the need for community involvement and 
participation9. Private sector actors are also reluctant, however, to invest significant time and 
resources in preparing REDD+ projects, given the complex processes involved, uncertainties 
and the lack of a well-functioning voluntary carbon market.10 
 
A number of international conservation agencies involved in promoting large scale REDD+ 
projects appear to have adopted the narrative of REDD+ as a major opportunity, but appear to 
have modified this as a result of slow progress in practice and the lack of a clear and transparent 
model for how REDD+ carbon funding would operate in practice in Mozambique. Although no 
national civil society organisations have adopted a position of uncritical support for large scale 
REDD+ projects, there are some stark contrasts in views articulated amongst environmental 
NGOs, for whom REDD+ has proven very divisive. While some leading national environmental 
NGOs, such as CTV (Centro Terra Viva) and ORAM (Rural Organization for Mutual Aid) are 
involved in the REDD+ testing and consultations, others, notably Justiça Ambiental (JA!) have 
been strongly opposed to REDD+ in any form. JA! argued, among others, that REDD+ as 
conceived in Mozambique fails to address the real problems of deforestation and that the 
government does not really understand what is involved in tackling the drivers.11  
 
One of the key challenges has been the lack of clear institutional leadership responsibilities 
from the government, and a consequent uncertainty about what REDD+ projects would mean 
in practice. The two central government actors, the Ministry for Environmental Coordination 
(MICOA), and the National Directorate for Lands and Forests (DNTF, part of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, MINAG), have had very different roles in the REDD+ process and views on what it 
                                                
 
 
9 Interview with representative of an international forestry investor in Mozambique, 1 Nov 2013; Director 
of a Mozambican carbon trading company, 6 Nov 2013 
10 Interview with representative of an international forestry investor in Mozambique, 1 Nov 2013 
11 Interviews with Justiça Ambiental staff members on 14 and 15 November 2013 
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should be. MICOA is the lead agency on climate change and with a mandate for cross-sector 
coordination in the fields of environment and climate change. MICOA considers REDD+ as 
primarily an opportunity for Mozambique to contribute to climate change mitigation through 
emissions reduction and forest carbon sequestration, and in turn revenue generation from 
carbon payments through the voluntary carbon markets or from disbursement of global forest 
carbon funds.12 DNTF, on the other hand, remains the lead technical agency on forest 
management in Mozambique. It plays a joint leadership role for REDD+, and is likely to be 
centrally involved in supervising implementation of REDD+ projects and the monitoring of forest 
cover and forest carbon stocks.  DNTF sees REDD+ primarily as an opportunity to strengthen 
an under-resourced forest management regime,13 and considered that instead of the 
promulgation of REDD+ legislation, the priority should have been to revise existing forest 
legislation to meet the requirements of REDD+.14  
 
Both organisations are involved in the REDD+ Technical Unit, which is housed within MICOA, 
a situation which various informants described as the result of a considerable power struggle 
between MICOA and DNTF. MICOA’s lack of technical expertise in forest management and 
carbon monitoring will require strong collaboration with the DNTF and with MINAG more broadly 
in order to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in Mozambique. In 
practice both agencies will have a role in scrutinising and approving REDD+ projects as defined 
in the legislation, although it is unclear how they will work together.  
 
Beyond this, there are numerous tensions in the process originating from concerns over REDD+ 
in Mozambique chiefly focusing on large scale carbon forestry and forest conservation, 
complaints over very limited opportunities for participation among key stakeholders, and a view 
among some that REDD+ to a large extent is a ‘done deal’ with few opportunities for 
modification.15 Both JA! and UNAC (National Peasants Union) made early criticisms of the 
                                                
 
 
12 Interviews with MICOA officials dealing with REDD+, November 2013 
13 Interviews with DNTF officials and advisers, November 2013 and February 2014 
14 Interviews with DNTF official and technical adviser, 24 February 2014 
15 Interviews with national NGOs, Maputo, November 2013 
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REDD+ national strategy process, centred on its apparent focus on market mechanisms, the 
lack of involvement of civil society in the early debates and the concerns that monoculture 
projects that could be eligible for REDD+ finance would displace peasant farmers (Via 
Campesina Africa 2012) . Via Campesina Africa (2012) also considered that community and 
farmers’ consultations in July 2011, which included 889 individuals (Sitoe et al. 2012), were 
unrepresentative for a country with more than 20 million people. JA! has denounced the lack of 
transparent information about and lack of access to the REDD+ process for those interested in 
following it, complaining that information provided by government and its partners in the REDD+ 
Working Group meetings was concerned only with opportunities for REDD+ for Mozambique, 
rather than the risks and potential problems (Via Campesina Africa 2012). 
 
The three domestic narratives described above are broadly aligned with those in international 
debates on REDD+, and appear to be largely influenced by pre-determined pro- and anti- 
market perspectives on natural resources and environmental services, rather than empirical 
evidence and analysis of REDD+ performance and sustainability in forest utilization in 
Mozambique. Views are likely to have been coloured, however, by several factors, including 
Mozambique’s recent history of large-scale land acquisitions, ensuing conflicts and policy 
controversies, and negative features of REDD+ and forest investment experience elsewhere. 
Apart from the controversy highlighted above around lack of transparency and limited 
consultation in the REDD+ process in Mozambique, interviewees highlighted a general lack of 
practical models to understand of how carbon payments for REDD+ will actually work, if not 
through the sale of carbon credits.16  
 
Emerging outcomes of Mozambique’s single sustained experience of carbon forestry through 
the Sofala Carbon Project have also created scepticism among many civil society actors. 
Instead of seeking direct control of forest land under community utilisation, this project aimed 
to increase farmer and community incomes by combining tree planting and improved natural 
                                                
 
 
16 Interviews with national NGOs, Maputo, November 2013 
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forest management to produce carbon credits for sale on the voluntary market, and company – 
community revenue sharing.  Despite an EU grant, however, it faced difficulties attracting 
investors, sustaining farmer incentives and financing sustainable community livelihoods and 
natural resource management activities due to the declining price of carbon (Mathur et al. 2014; 
Jindal et al. 2012). 
 
Consequences – entrenchment or spaces for change?  
 
A range of possible REDD+ approaches and outcomes can link climate policy and development 
goals, but with potentially very different outcomes for communities reliant on forest resources 
and farming in terms of the balance and distribution of benefits. Outcomes largely depend on 
the nature of REDD+ activities in practice, and the ways in which these can combine, on the 
one hand, conservation and improved management of natural forest and, on the other, 
exclusion or inclusion of local communities, small scale farmers and other forest users from 
forest carbon areas and projects. Mozambique’s limited carbon forestry experience suggests 
risks of benefit capture by relatively well-off farmers, a potential to derive much greater carbon 
savings from natural forest conservation and management rather than tree planting, and greater 
potential for community benefit sharing, sustainable forest industries and improved agricultural 
practices. Difficulties remain, however, in measuring and verifying carbon storage in natural 
and semi-natural forests, and carbon payments through the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) 
have not been sufficient to fund these activities, leaving projects dependent on supplementary 
sources of finance. 
  
Although there is some limited policy space to achieve a balance amongst small and large scale 
REDD+ approaches, and the interests of different stakeholder groups, there is as yet no single 
body in Mozambique with REDD+ oversight, mandate, technical capacity, institutional interest, 
adequate networks and convening power to engage the full range of actors and establish a 
feasible and sustainable mix of REDD+ activities. There remain huge uncertainties in what 
REDD+ will look like in practice, whether and how REDD+ activities may contribute to a climate 
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change and development policy goals in Mozambique, and the social distribution of costs and 
benefits.  
 
In its dominant conception in Mozambique, REDD+ has been posited as a techno-managerial 
solution for carbon emissions reduction that presents opportunities for private profit and 
government revenue generation. This approach has ignored the complex, contested political 
context of forest and land use dynamics in the country, and treated exclusion of forest 
dependent communities as a technical problem, somehow solvable at the project level, or by 
policy action in other sectors. The forest sector as a whole is subject to perverse incentives for 
official rent-seeking in licensing forest operations at multiple levels, enabling illegal logging and 
unprocessed timber exports. There is an apparent lack of high level political will and vested 
interests which allow uncontrolled forest degradation to continue.17 These are questions that 
REDD+ planning and finance have so far been unable to address. Narrow sector-based 
perspectives, failures of institutional coordination, centralizing political tendencies, vested elite 
and external interests in business-as-usual timber extraction, and limitations in policy space for 
actor participation all illustrate the centrality of political economy in reframing REDD+ in 
Mozambique to address broader national interests in accessing and utilizing climate finance. 
 
REDD+ has potentially considerable implications for adaptation, yet so far its discussion – and 
contestation - has taken place within sectoral confines, disconnected from adaptation or 
broader development goals. Private sector and government interests have combined to shape 
a fairly narrow set of options for utilisation of REDD+ finance around environmental benefits 
and forest management. Arguably, however, the lack of momentum on REDD+ finance in 
Mozambique may also provide options for giving more emphasis to the non-carbon values of 
forests, including adaptation.  
 
                                                
 
 
17 Interviews with national and international NGO and donor agency representatives, Maputo, November 
2013  
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4 Discussion  
 
Four issues stand out from the preceding sections, broadly mapping onto the framework 
outlined at the start.  
 
4.1 Historical contexts and contested political ecologies 
 
The historical context matters such that climate policy actors and initiatives need with ‘work with 
the grain’ of settled policy networks and relations of power while being attentive to when and 
how they might change. While the climate policy context is new, both low carbon energy and 
carbon forestry have entered arenas of long standing entrenched interests and power relations.  
Each of the debates about competing use of resources discussed here have long historical 
trajectories, and illustrate the need to understand issues of resource access, property and 
justice in each setting as underscored by our emphasis on political ecology (Robbins 2004). In 
other words, identifying the broader contextual factors within which climate policy and 
development initiatives sit is critical if we want to have a clearer idea of how feasible they are 
and what needs to change in order for their achievement to become a more realistic prospect. 
The Mozambique study showed, for example, the importance of understanding long standing 
controversies surrounding land tenure, large scale land investment, forest management, and 
agricultural intensification, beyond the confines of the national climate change debates. 
Similarly in Kenya, devolution has created new sites of contest over control of electricity grid 
extension while geothermal resource development adds new value to land that has been under 
contested ownership for decades, fuelling renewed, violent evictions. Capturing these dynamics 
means going beyond institutional mapping and the formal flows of decision-making authority to 
try and understand the informal networks and practices that shape who participates in key 
decisions and who wields most influence in different policy spaces. This is the value of deeper 
political economy analysis – in opening up understanding of the political, social and institutional 
landscape into which climate finance and development initiatives enter and with which, if they 
are to be effective, they will have to engage. 
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4.2 Power, politics and institutions 
 
Money talks in climate change and development, as elsewhere. There is great deal at stake in 
debates over climate change and development goals. This brings different institutions with 
competing mandates and ideologies, and a wide variety of actors with conflicting material 
interests and uneven power, into competition with one another in climate change and 
development policy spaces. Tracking the levels and instruments of finance (‘following the 
money’), for example, is crucial to understanding the alignments of interests assembled for – 
and against – linked climate change and development objectives.  Both Kenya and 
Mozambique have significant fossil fuel reserves that represent the ‘elephant in the room’ in 
discussions over climate change and development, and both countries’ energy trajectories 
could just as easily follow a high carbon as a low carbon pathway. Power will determine which 
pathway is chosen. Incentive structures remain in place for state elites to continue to 
accommodate donor priorities, creating additional or parallel policy initiatives while pursuing 
more lucrative revenues afforded by carbon-intensive development. Such is the case with 
donor-led efforts in Kenya to support lower carbon forms of energy for large populations off-
grid, while policy makers focus their attention on the exploration and production of coal, oil and 
gas, for both domestic and international consumption. Global subsidies for fossil fuel production 
and consumption dwarf both the support for renewable energy technologies, and the 
investments required for universal access to modern energy services (IMF 2015). In 
Mozambique, the discovery of coal and gas reserves could be a considerable driver of 
deforestation and land use change, yet has so far not figured in debates over REDD+ and 
carbon forestry in the country.  
 
4.3 International political economy 
 
While there is an increasing focus on nationally driven processes, both low carbon energy and 
carbon forestry still appear as internationally driven, with (as yet) limited national ownership. In 
both cases, the analysis helped bring out the extent to which drivers of change are coming from 
outside government, suggesting the value of tools and approaches from international political 
27 
 
 
 
economy. These can be used to explain how donors and international businesses can shape 
the degree of policy autonomy or ‘developmental space’ (Gallagher 2005; Harrison 2004) 
available to developing countries to handle trade-offs between poverty alleviation, mitigation 
and adaptation in ways which advance their own preferred development pathways. In both case 
studies international agencies, multilateral development banks and transnational corporations 
have a powerful role to play in shaping decisions at national and sub-national level about which 
development pathway to pursue, and the extent to which it will be compatible with both climate 
policy and development goals. This is because of their control of finance, production, 
technology and trade. Whether it is flows of finance from REDD+ and the fluctuating price of 
carbon credits affecting the balance of political power in Mozambique or the presence of donors 
and investors in Kenya rallying behind particular low carbon energy options, global actors have 
a key role to play in how the trade-offs involved in establishing synergistic climate change and 
development trajectories are weighted and managed.  
 
This is also confirmed by other recent case studies, highlighting how external pressures can 
exacerbate competition and conflict, for example, around donors’ bilateral links with individual 
agencies. In Ghana, for example, Tanner et al. (2014) showed how the removal of fuel subsidies 
has little association with climate change mitigation for national elites who face renewed 
budgetary constraints, whereas climate change mitigation priorities strengthen the hand of 
multilateral donors for whom such public subsidies are already an inefficient use of government 
resources. In Kenya, climate change and the vulnerability of hydropower to low rainfall has 
driven the diversification of the electricity mix. But any energy source that can generate 
electricity at low cost and at large scale is being considered – renewable or non-renewable, 
including additional hydropower (MoEP 2012). While the demonstrable impacts of climate 
change are steering policy, climate change mitigation remains a donor driven priority for the 
most part.  
 
4.4 Levers for change 
 
The case studies also illustrate some of the levers for change, the power to be navigated, and 
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with whom external or internal actors will have to engage in order to address the climate change 
and development goals. The Kenya study showed, for example, how the country is at a critical 
juncture for its renewable energy policy, and political economy analysis can help identify 
coalitions to push against those who have vested interests that go against climate change and 
development goals. 
 
The Mozambique study illustrated how REDD+ may take very different forms depending on 
who is defining it. Overall, there are many potential scenarios that conceivably could be seen 
as in line with climate change and development, but they represent very different visions of 
what development is, what type of practical interventions should take place, how benefit sharing 
should be organised, and could generate very distinct discursive framings of what should count 
as climate change and development goals.  
 
For instance, while REDD+ is in principle compatible with large scale forest conservation, which 
could potentially offer mitigation benefits, they are less likely to be pro-poor and tend to restrict 
access of poor people to agricultural land and natural resources. Conversely, REDD+ could 
mean smaller scale carbon agroforestry projects that could provide development, adaptation 
and mitigation benefits, but which are struggling to secure sufficient finance in view of the 
challenges in achieving carbon savings at scale and the poor performance of the carbon 
markets. If these efforts have less traction with a government more focused on larger 
investments in land with greater scale effects, then resources may be mobilised away from one 
vision of climate change and development goals more rooted in poverty reduction and towards 
one which favours existing interest groups already well-placed to press their advantage. This 
highlights the importance of REDD+ safeguards, in that weak compliance or monitoring of 
safeguards could reinforce elite rent capture from big ‘development’ projects sanctioned by 
broader government narratives that prioritise rapid economic growth, but do not necessarily 
deliver poverty reduction or climate adaptation benefits of any kind. The Kenya case study also 
raises questions about the social impacts of the embrace of ‘lower carbon’ geothermal energy, 
and highlights the ways that geothermal energy has become more attractive to the existing 
supply system than alternatives that would require more substantive change in the way that 
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electricity and social power is distributed. 
 
5 Conclusions: Understanding and navigating complex change processes 
 
This paper asked what happens when initiatives motivated by climate change policy goals 
encounter wider and more complex national development policy contexts, illustrated by the 
cases of low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon forestry in Mozambique. In both cases, 
understanding the prospects for achieving climate change and development goals require an 
unpacking of the political economy surrounding the issues; the politics, power and interests that 
shape the debates, drive the agenda and determine outcomes. Notwithstanding the significant 
differences between the two case studies, they also provide lessons on the potentials - and 
limitations - of how to navigate complex change processes. Three lessons that stand out are, 
first, that issues must be understood in view of long standing debates and struggles over 
resources between institutions and actors, which affect how and why they engage with climate 
change policy. Second, attempts to work with or against the grain of politics in a particular 
setting require an appreciation of the social and political networks and relations of power which 
will determine how the trade-offs inherent to climate change and development goals are worked 
through and on whose behalf. Third, the role of the global political economy, in the form of 
global economic institutions, corporations and donors, critically shapes outcomes at the 
national and sub-national level albeit in ways mediated by the differential policy autonomy that 
governments have. 
 
The analysis showed how initiatives to support climate change and development policy goals 
unfold within and are shaped by existing policy and decision making processes, which need to 
be understood and engaged with. Reading the political and institutional landscape enables 
those advocating change, including aid donors and civil society actors, to work out who they 
can support and who is resistant to an agenda focussed on climate change and development, 
and to expose some of the obstacles to change that could be beneficial to poorer groups. The 
case studies also illustrate that political economy analysis cannot be reduced to a generic tool 
to manage change on terms set by powerful external actors, nor as a shorthand for highlighting 
30 
 
 
 
governance failures in already weak and struggling states. Rather, it should serve as a useful 
starting point for an informed and grounded discussion about who is benefiting from existing 
ways of addressing climate change and development, how and why; and more importantly who 
is not benefiting, and what can be done about it. 
 
As highlighted by the examples of low carbon energy in Kenya and carbon forestry in 
Mozambique, political economy perspectives are critical in identifying how and why climate and 
development trajectories are either enabled or frustrated by existing policy processes.  Such 
analysis can inform the development and implementation of climate initiatives, particularly in 
the context of scarce international climate finance where efficiency and effectiveness are 
heavily scrutinised. They provide a tool to characterise informal relations that can frustrate 
formal processes, and identify opportunities to construct more effective coalitions for change.  
 
Yet political economy analysis is perhaps most powerful where it can also provide insights into 
the injustices and exclusions that result from business-as-usual policy-making that is unlikely 
to be reversed by institutional tinkering and near-term policy reform. Policy and institutional 
changes to bring about greater integration of climate and development policy are likely to 
require longer-term efforts to engage with policy spaces, and to shift the balance of power in 
favour of poorer and excluded groups that have most to lose from climate change and most to 
gain from actions which simultaneously reduce poverty, lower greenhouse gas emissions, and 
tackle climate change impacts. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual lenses for analysing policy processes (adapted from Wolmer et al 2006) 
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Table 1:  components of analysis, research questions & methods 
 
Stage	of	
analysis	
Questions	 Methods	 Who	to	engage	and	how	
Context	 What	is	the	policy	
problem/resource	issue?	
	
Who/what	are	the	key	
actors/institutions/processes?	
Actor	and	institution	
mapping	
	
	
Document	analysis	
	
Identify	key	policy	
documents/processes/	
decision-making	
arenas	
Involve	actors	in	their	
own	‘perception’	
mapping	of	networks	of	
power	&	influence	
	
Use	this	analysis	to	
identify	key	change	
agents	for	research		
engagement	&	uptake	
	
	
Competition	 How	are	they	linked?	(spaces,	
brokers	&	intermediaries)	
	
What	is	their	influence	and	
power?	(How	much/what	type?	
Material,	institutional,	
discursive/structural/visible-
invisible	etc)	
Mapping	Networks	
	
Following	processes	
	
Tracing	informal	
networks	of	power	&	
formal/institutional	
expressions	of	power	
Interviews	
	
Participatory	actor	
mapping	
	
Identify	key	policy	
moments	(case	studies)	
from	above		
	
network	analysis	
	
Consequences	
	
What	are	the	implications	for	
climate	change	and	
development?	(trade-offs,	who	
wins/loses,	scenarios	for	change)	
	
Scenarios-	expanding	
policy	spaces	for	
‘triple-win’	
	
Trade-off	analysis	at	
workshops	with	potential	
change	agents	
	
Try	and	link	to	key	policy	
debates/windows	for	
change	
